Periodic Tenancies: Effect of Insufficient Notice to Terminate by Greene, Raymond A., Jr.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 12
1-1956
Periodic Tenancies: Effect of Insufficient Notice to
Terminate
Raymond A. Greene Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Raymond A. Greene Jr., Periodic Tenancies: Effect of Insufficient Notice to Terminate, 8 Hastings L.J. 108 (1956).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol8/iss1/12
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
"It is significant that under section 61, subdivision 2 of the Civil Code, a subse-
quent marriage contracted by a person when the former husband or wife of such
person is generally reputed or believed by such person to be dead is valid until its
nullity is adjudged by a competent tribunal even if the former husband or wife has
not been absent for five years and the general repute or belief proves to be erroneous.
It would be anomalous to hold that although in the Civil Code the Legislature sanc-
tions such a marriage and makes it valid until it is annulled (it may never be annulled
and may therefore always be valid), in the Penal Code the Legislature makes such a
person guilty of bigamy."' 5
Under this newly proclaimed rule, the individual who contracts a second mar-
riage within the five-year statutory period with an honest though erroneous belief
that his former spouse has divorced him or is dead is not subject to a bigamy
prosecution, and his marriage is valid though subject to a suit for annulment.
The reconciliation of the Penal and Civil Codes in connection with plural
marriages, accomplished sub silentio in the Vogel case, obviates the necessity of
legislative clarification by way of amendment of this vexatious, although thus far
academic question. The courts are no longer faced with the problem of construing
Civil Code section 61, subdivision 2 with respect to a second marriage contracted
within the five-year period in the good faith belief that the former spouse is dead.
It is clearly valid, and the individual concerned has a good defense to a bigamy
prosecution.
Robert E. Carlson
PERIODIC TENANCIES: EFFECT OF AN INSUFFICIENT NOTICE TO TERMINATE
A well established but seldom applied ,rule of Real Property law was over-
looked by both the court and counsel in the recent California case of Kingston v.
Colburn.'
A tenancy from month to month was entered into between plaintiff landlords
and defendant lessees on October 7th, 1952, after entry by lessees under a void
lease. On January l1th, 1954, the lessees notified the landlords that they were
terminating the tenancy as of January 10th, 1954. Although not stated in the
report, the facts show that the landlords brought suit on May 24th, 1954, to
recover the rent due from January 10, 1954, to May 10, 1954.
The court, referring to section 1946 of the California Civil Code, stated that
as tenants from month to month, lessees could terminate their tenancy "by
giving at least 30 days written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be
due and payable to and including the date of termination." 2 The court then
concluded:
"Necessarily therefore the notice of January 11 was insufficient and not in compliance
with the statute so as to terminate the tenancy on January 10, but that is not to say
it would not have been effective as of February 10.'
This writer must take exception to this last statement as being in direct
conflict with the common law of our country and as having no support in the
statutes or decisions of California.
The question under consideration in this article, then, is: When a notice to
15 Id. at 803-04, 299 Pac.2d at 854.
1139 Cal.App.2d 623, 293 P.2d 805 (1956).2 d. at 625, 293 P.2d at 807.
8Ibid.
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terminate a periodic tenancy is insufficient in length of time to terminate the
tenancy on the date designated in the notice, what effect will -it have on termi-
nating the tenancy at a future date without any further notice?
Perhaps it would be appropriate at this point to restate briefly the history
of periodic tenancies both in this country and in England, and to examine the
common law principles governing them. The tenancies in question were formu-
lated in the sixteenth century to replace some of the earlier tenancies at will.
Estates at will were, and are now, capable of being terminated by either party
without any period of notice,4 although some statutes provide for a contrary
result.5 Periodic tenancies were designed to give greater stability to the tenancy.
It is a well established principle of common law that when one enters into
possession of land under a void lease, said lease reserving a rent payable in
monthly installments, and the lessee pays and the landlord accepts one or more
monthly installments, a periodic tenancy from month to month is created.6 A
recent California decision in accord with the common law so held.7
It is also well established today that a proper notice is necessary to terminate
a tenancy from month to month.8 This doctrine of notice to quit in periodic ten-
ancies has been recognized since the time of Henry VIII, and is recorded in the
year books as well as the early English Reports. 9 The requirement of notice to
terminate such tenancies is mutual, applying to termination by either the land-
lord or the tenant,
The California Civil Code, section 1946,10 is in accord with this common law
rule as to the requirement of a notice to terminate and the California courts
have so held."
What is proper notice to terminate such a tenancy? English common law
is that a weekly or other periodic tenancy is determinable by a notice to quit,
which in the absence of special stipulations, should be given so as to expire at
the end of any complete period of the tenancy and should be equal to the length
of the period.' 2 The common law ruling in our country is to the same effect, hold-
ing that in cases of tenancies running from month to month, a month's notice
is necessary to terminate, and that notice must be directed toward the end of a
rental period. This has been shown in numerous early cases.' 3
California statutory law has changed the common law as to notice to termi-
nate tenancies from month to month with respect to the length of notice required
4 Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100 (1944) ; Mayo v. Clafin, 93 Vt. 76, 106
A. 653 (1919).
5 
CALiv. Civ. CODE § 789.
6 Quayle v. Stone, 43 Idaho 306, 251 Pac.630 (1926) ; State v. Robinson, 143 Ark. 456,
220 S.W. 836 (1920); Goodwin v. Clover, 91 Minn. 438, 98 N.W. 322 (1904).
7 Psihozios v. Humberg, 80 CalApp.2d 215, 181 P.2d 699 (1947).
8 Oesterreicher v. Robertson, 187 Minn. 497, 245 N.W. 825 (1932); Condon v. Barr
47 N.J.. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1884).
9 Right v. Darby 1 T.R. 159, 99 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1786) ; 2 BL. CozMW. 147.
1
0 "A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties is deemed to be
renewed . .. at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written
notice to the other of his intention to terminate the same... "
-U Renner v. Hunington-Hawthore Oil & Gas Co., 39 Cal.2d 93, 244 P.2d 895 (1952);
Colyear v. Tobriner, 7 Cal.2d 735, 62 P.2d 741 (1936); Dora v. Oppenheim, 45 CalApp. 312,
187 Pac. 462 (1919).
12 20 HAISBURy'S LAWS OF ExGLANG (2 ed.) 145, 146.
Is Phoenixville v. Walters, 147 Pa. 501, 23 A. 776 (1892) ; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 III. 96
(1854) ; see also cases cited in note 8, supra.
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and the time when it may be given. Section 1946 of the Civil Code states that 30
days notice must b- given and that it can be given at any time. Recent California
decisions have applied this statute to tenancies from month to month.14
As noted above, notice is still essential to termination and the only statutory
changes are those affecting length and time of notice. Kingston v. Colburn
squarely presents the question whether a notice that fails to meet these statutory
standards for the date specified for termination can operate to terminate the
tenancy at a later date. The answer to this question is left completely unanswered
in both the statutes and previous California cases. Consequently we must look
to the common law for our answer."s It will not be presumed that the common law
was repealed by statutory or constitutional provision unless the language naturally
and necessarily leads to that conclusion.' 6 The California Statute changed the
common law as stated above but did not mention or concern itself with this
question. In California the common law is the rule of decision and remains in
force except where modified by statute.17
The common law answers in the negative, stating that an insufficient notice
to terminate the tenancy on the date designated is a nullity for all purposes and
will not terminate the tenancy at the end of the subsequent period without
further notice.'8 The California Court in the case under discussion, after acknowl-
edging that the notice given was insufficient, concluded, without citing precedent,
that the insufficient notice would terminate the tenancy the following month
without a new notice being given. The point in question was not mentioned by
either party in their briefs, but the court so concluded without citing any pre-
vious cases or statutes.
The landmark case stating the American common law on this question is
Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins and Company,19 which points out the effect of insuffi-
cient notice. There the facts showed that the lessees entered the land in question
under a void lease, paying the designated rent and creating a periodic tenancy.
In the original suit20 brought by the lessors, the court ruled that the notice by
the lessees that they were abandoning the premises was insufficient to terminate
the tenancy because of the common law principles discussed above. The court
at that trial awarded the lessors the rent due up to the time of the suit. In a
subsequent suit,21 the lessors sued the lessees again, this time for the rent due
from the date of the last suit to the date on which the second action was brought.
The court here not only decided that the notice was insufficient to terminate the
tenancy at the time indicated by the lessees, but also allowed recovery on a suit
brought 38 months later for rent accrued during that time. The conclusion is
that the notice was not only insufficient to terminate on the date designated but
was a nullity for all purposes and would not terminate the tenancy at a later date.
The court in their opinion asked the question, "Why could not that notice
14 Hennessy v. Gleason, 81 Cal.App.2d 616, 184, P.2d 914 (1947); La Cava v. Breed-
love, 77 Cal. App. 2d 129, 174 P.2d 880 (1946).
15 In re Elizalde's Estate, 182 Cal. 427, 188 Pac. 560 (1920).
16Inre Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal.App.2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 (1936).
17 see note 15 supra.
18 
Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 57 W.Va. 580, 50 S.E. 813 (1905) ; Grace v. Michaud,
50 Minn. 139, 52 N.W. 390 (1892).
1 9 Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co. see note 18 supra.
o Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 52 W.Va. 476, 44 S.E. 149 (1903).
21 Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co. 57 W.Va. 580, 50 S.E. 813 (1905).
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